We all knew coming into this first season that we’d see change and development go hand in hand under Rodgers. He made it clear in his press conferences and interviews that this wasn’t the season for success, but instead to build the foundations for future success. His reason being: why win one cup now, when you can win five later?
With this development, we have seen the team undergo nothing short of reconstructive surgery. Our facials have changed, but more importantly, so has our personality and character. Fight is being shown on a weekly basis and not just on those ‘special Anfield nights’; this can only be a positive.
A lot of this comes with confidence but this is built upon the respect that the players have for the manager. Rodgers commands an aura that I haven’t seen from a Liverpool manager for a long time. He executes everything at his own pace, but it’s always justified. He is stubborn enough to succeed, but he exudes this stubbornness to an extent where it never compromises the team (take first half tactical substitutions as the example, if you will).
However, the subject that interests me the most is how he sets up his team and how they change dependent on whether they are in possession or not.
This week we were lucky enough to watch the great Barcelona play their finest football; pressing, passing and, ultimately, scoring. It may be stupid to draw parallels (and call me a fool for doing so) but in terms of replication, the style is being implemented. The high press, the patient build up and then that clinical edge – something we have certainly developed under Rodgers.
The 4-2-3-1 seems to be Rodgers’ default. He likes his midfield dictators similar to how he likes his flair players and creative initiators, as he understands a balance is needed. However, as much as Sky Sports may project this 4-2-3-1 on a pre-match graphic, I don’t think this is how we actually play. I think we only play this for 2 minutes of the whole 90. Minute one and minute forty-six: both straight after kick off when we have set up to face the opposition, like for like. But this is the beauty of being managed by someone like Rodgers – we become adaptable.
With a full strength side out, Gerrard and Lucas occupy the traditional ‘2’ sitting in front of the defenders. Their job: to drop in when needed and likewise drive forward. However, when Liverpool possess the ball, this is far from the case. Instead in this ‘transition’, we see the full backs push high to create a new ‘3’ in midfield, whilst Lucas drops in between the two centre backs to provide cover.
Yellow Dots = Original 4-2-3-1 Set Up. Red Dots = When In Possession of The Ball
The key is fluidity. This is mostly found in the midfield, where all three are expected to move around the pitch. The diagram above illustrates how the quickly the formation changes. Instead of a strict 4-2-3-1, Liverpool play a lot of the match (due to being in possession of the ball for large periods) in more of a 3-3-3-1, or if you are horrendously pedantic, a 2-1-3-2-1-1. Centre backs split, the holding midfielder drops from the natural ‘2’ and the full backs produce the width as the ‘wingers’ become, infamously, ‘false’. As Downing and Co. tuck inside to allow the overlap, it pushes the attacking midfield one of two ways: either he joins the lone striker, or the lone central midfielder – this is usually dependent on the space between the opposition lines of defence and midfield.
Above you can see the traditional 4-2-3-1 in yellow dots, however the arrows point to how the formation quickly becomes something different (red dots). As Gerrard tucks inside on his own, he always has the outward ball to either wing, through the onrushing full back; either Enrique or Johnson. However, he can also be offered Suàrez short or a more risky pass into Coutinho and Downing.
Sometimes I feel this frustrates Steven Gerrard as he is a player who wants direct play. In contrast to his natural style, the system eliminates his ability to pass straight to the lone frontman (Sturridge), like he did so frequently with Fernando Torres. This forces him to go through the ‘transition’ and not miss a phase; but this is counter to Gerrard’s psyche and sometimes this surfaces itself with loose or ambitious passes. He wants to be able to play that ‘long diagonal’ or seeking through ball more often; but this is limited by the positioning of the forward players – blocking off the route to the striker, and forcing the simple, easily-executed pass that allows Liverpool to go ‘through the motions’ of the attacking transition.
Distribution Channels with the 3-3-3-1
Distribution channels are also paramount to a great passing side, and this can be seen no clearer than with Pepe Reina. If we take the 3-3-3-1 model and draw on it (as seen above) we see three, almost straight, distribution channels that feed straight from the goalkeeper to the central striker. Now, what’s good about this is that when there are parallel lines of players on the pitch, it opens up the opportunities for triangles to be made. One-two’s within triangles can eliminate opposition players from the game in an instant and allow the pressing side to enhance their attacking threat. Although it seems to detour the direct, triangles on the football pitch are vital to clever attacking. These shapes are mostly formed by the full backs or wingers as they commandeer down the flank, passing inside to one of the dictators of play, only to receive it back on the other side of the opposition player.
We can see this in action from the start of the season right the way through to the Tottenham game. The flanks are used far heavier than the centre of the field, where a lot of teams employ five midfielders. That’s why the full backs are so pivotal to the system – in some ways they carry the system as they take the burden for what the other players do creatively. Enrique and Johnson don’t get enough plaudits for their work to retain the system and the shape of the team. But as you can see below, Enrique has grown into the season as we see his ‘heat map’ increase in ferocity from the 26th of August to the 4th of March. We also, with the addition of Coutinho, have a new attacking midfielder that allows Enrique to bomb forward with more cover.
Courtesy of SquawkaSports
The image above also shows how key Lucas is to the system. His area of the pitch is one of the ‘reddest’ on the graphic when played against Tottenham, however on the heat map for Manchester City earlier in the season, where he was subbed off after 3 minutes, we see how little control we have of the ball in holding midfield area. Lucas controls the play from deep, even if you don’t see it every second of the game. It also proves the 3-3-3-1 formation right when Liverpool have the ball. The Brazilian comes to receive the ball off of the two centre halves and brings the ball out, through the distribution channels.
It’s also nice to see the academy teams employing the same tactics as the first team. When I went to St Mary’s, to watch our U21s take on Southampton, Conor Coady was used as the ‘third centre back’ when the full backs flew on to support the central midfielder (Joao Teixeira), whilst Suso and the wingers supported the lone frontman which, for this game, was Jonjo Shelvey.
This was again replicated at home to West Ham U21s. This time, though, Jonjo Shelvey was the ‘third centre back’, dropping in between Wisdom and Coady, whilst McLaughlin and Roddan flew forward at any given opportunity. If the U21 players are learning the system, it makes transition (there’s that word again) easier if they are called upon.
There are other scenarios, however. Sadly the ideal starting eleven isn’t always fit and, because of this, Rodgers has proven to be pragmatic.
If we take Sturridge out of the team, therefore forcing us to play Suàrez as the lone forward, we see a completely different shaped side. Instead of the three in midfield made up of the full backs and the remaining central midfielder, we see the much coveted ‘1-2’ midfield in the 4-2-3-1. For the picky, it’s more of a 4-1-4-1.
Lets say we bring Joe Allen in for Sturridge, pairing him with Lucas and Gerrard in the middle, we see Allen and Gerrard infront of the deep Brazilian. However, as this makes the midfield split slightly, it means there isn’t as much room for the full backs to get forward and therefore the wingers have to stay true to their position.
Without Sturridge We Are Forced To Change Formation To 4-1-4-1
This, naturally, allows play to slow and the ball to be commanded in a more central position with the three midfielders (and Suàrez, who drops deep). This is one of the reasons Coutinho was subbed for Allen against Tottenham. Not only does Joe Allen bring a singular passing dimension to the team, he installs a confident passing dimension in the whole side and, arguably, single-handedly changed the formation from 3-3-3-1 to 4-1-4-1.
It’s clear Brendan realised, at 2-1, that ball retention was getting sloppy and passing was becoming desperate and direct, even though thirty minutes remained. Allen calmed things down with a change of system as much as a change of personnel – something I believe Jordan Henderson wouldn’t have been able to do as well. From this and other matches we have come to realise that Joe Allen’s part in Liverpool’s ‘transition’ is further forward than we first thought it would be. At Swansea he was the forward midfielder when paired with Britton – now, at Liverpool, he could be the further forward player when paired with Lucas. But that’s a whole different argument that I started here.
The system changes as much as the manager wants it too. This fantasy is reciprocated by the fans, as they seek silverware and success – if change is needed, change should happen. One of these changes is how the team plays in their fluidity. There is no strict answer to how they do it, but that is the point exactly. Every player is learning to play in two or three different positions, a la Total Football. I’m not saying that’s the overriding goal for Liverpool, but there are certain parallels to be drawn.
Whether it’s a 4-2-3-1 or a 2-1-3-2-1-1, Rodgers doesn’t give a monkeys. It’s slowly starting to come together, the tight 4-3-3 that set up on the first game of the season is transforming into an interchangeable 3-3-3-1. This is the recipe for success; pace yet patience – turnovers and transition.
